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1 Introduction
In this paper we study cooperative Ramsey equilibria in the open economy, addressing
classic policy questions such as: Should restrictions be placed on free trade and capital
mobility? Should capital income be taxed? Should goods be taxed based on origin or
destination? What are desirable border adjustments? How can the Ramsey equilibrium
be implemented with residence-based taxation of asset income?
We take the Ramsey approach to optimal taxation, in that the tax system is ex-
ogenously given. We consider taxes widely used in practice in developed economies.
Those include consumption and labor income taxes, taxes on capital income, equity
returns, and returns on foreign assets, as well as value-added taxes with and without
border adjustments. As is well known, many tax policies yield the same distortions,
and the theory pins down those distortions in choices. Following the public finance
literature, we refer to these distortions as wedges.
The first main question we address is, what are the optimal wedges? In particular,
we ask whether the Ramsey equilibrium yields intertemporal wedges. If it does, we say
that future capital is taxed. If it does not, we say that future capital is not taxed. No
intertemporal wedges implies that intratemporal wedges are constant over time. This
means that uniform taxation is optimal. We also ask whether the Ramsey allocations
distort conditions for production efficiency associated with free trade. The second main
question addressed in this paper is, how can the optimal wedges be implemented? We
consider implementations that, we believe, are of interest to policy design.
The model is a neoclassical growth model with two countries with intermediate
goods that are traded internationally, as in Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1994). A
useful feature of the model is that it nests the closed economy neoclassical growth
model. We characterize the optimal cooperative Ramsey allocations and determine
what are optimal inter- and intratemporal wedges as well as wedges on the movement
of goods across borders. We determine the minimal set of fiscal instruments that
implement those allocations and study alternative sets of instruments that implement
those same allocations.
For general preferences, capital should not be taxed in the steady state, and there
is no presumption that it ought to be taxed along the transition. A subsidy may be
optimal. Another main result is that free trade, required for production efficiency, is
also optimal. In addition, for standard macro preferences with constant elasticities, it
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is not optimal to ever impose intertemporal wedges, meaning that it is not optimal to
tax capital. This result holds for the steady state but also for the transition.
A minimal set of instruments to implement the Ramsey allocation are consumption
and labor income taxes. There is no need for taxes on income from assets.1 For stan-
dard macro preferences, only a constant tax on either labor or consumption, possibly
different across countries, is necessary to implement the Ramsey allocation.
We move on to study alternative implementations in which assets are taxed. We
construct a residence-based tax system with capital income taxes on firms and a
country-specific, common tax on equity returns and returns from foreign assets. These
taxes, together with either a labor income tax or a consumption tax, implement the
Ramsey allocation. Capital income taxes are optimally set to zero. We also consider
alternative ways of taxing goods, in particular, value-added taxes with and without
border adjustments. A tax system with value-added taxes with border adjustments is
equivalent to the system with consumption taxes. However, a value-added tax without
border adjustment in general would distort the allocation of capital across countries.
Compensating, time-varying tariffs can undo those distortions. We discuss the impli-
cations of these results for the desirability of origin- versus destination-based taxation
of consumption.
There is a literature on value-added taxes with and without border adjustments.2
Grossman (1980), and Feldstein and Krugman (1990) show in static models that border
adjustments are irrelevant.3 Barbiero, Farhi, Gopinath, and Itskhoki (2017) make the
same point in a dynamic model with labor only. In our model with capital, border
adjustments matter.
Because the neoclassical growth model is nested in the open economy model we
study, the results on intertemporal and intratemporal wedges also apply in the closed
economy model. So in the closed economy there is also no presumption that capital
income should be taxed, not only in the steady state but also along the transition. This
result is in contrast with influential results in the literature on the optimal taxation
of capital. Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) show that capital should be taxed at its
maximum level initially and for a number of periods. Bassetto and Benhabib (2006)
1This does not mean that capital is not taxed, since intertemporal distortions may be optimal
along the transition for general preferences.
2See Auerbach, Devereux, Keen, and Vella (2017) for a policy evaluation of the recent destination-
based cash flow tax proposal.
3See also Dixit (1985).
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and Straub and Werning (2015) show that full taxation of capital can last forever.4 This
literature leads to the presumption that capital taxes should be high at least for some
time. Two assumptions are important for the contrasting results. The first assumption
concerns the confiscation of initial wealth. We assume, in line with Armenter (2008),
that confiscation is restricted both directly and indirectly through valuation effects.
The literature instead only restricts direct confiscation. The second assumption is on
the available instruments. In contrast with the literature, we allow for a rich set of
fiscal instruments.5 The contrasting results are explained in detail in a companion
paper on capital taxation in the closed economy by Chari, Nicolini and Teles (2016).
Chari et al. (2016) also show, extending results in Werning (2007), that hetero-
geneity in initial endowments of capital does not affect the optimal wedges. They also
relate the results on the optimal taxation of capital to the ones on uniform commod-
ity taxation in Atkinson and Stiglitz (1972) and optimality of production efficiency in
Diamond and Mirrlees (1971).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the two-country econ-
omy model with consumption and labor income taxes. We compute optimal Ramsey
allocations, show that trade should not be restricted, and show that, for standard
macro preferences, capital should never be taxed. In Section 3, we consider alternative
tax systems that implement the same Ramsey optimal allocation. We first consider a
common tax on income from domestic equity and from foreign assets, together with
a profit tax (Section 3.1). We also discuss alternative ways of taxing consumption
through value-added taxes with and without border adjustment (Sections 3.2 and 3.3).
Section 4 concludes.
2 A two-country economy
There are two countries in this economy indexed by i = 1, 2. The preferences of a
representative household in each country are over consumption cit and labor nit,
U i =
∞∑
t=0
βtui (cit, nit) , (1)
4Other relevant literature includes Chari, Christiano, Kehoe (1994), Atkeson, Chari and Kehoe
(1999), Coleman (2000), Judd (1999, 2002), and Lucas and Stokey (1983).
5With a rich set of instruments, if indirect confiscation through valuation effects was allowed for,
it would distort capital accumulation in the first period only.
4
satisfying the usual properties.
Following Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1994) only intermediate goods are traded.
Final goods are not traded.
Each country, i = 1, 2, produces a country specific intermediate good, yit, according
to a production technology given by
yi1t + yi2t = yit = F
i (kit, nit) , (2)
where yijt denotes the quantity of intermediate goods produced in country i and used in
country j = 1, 2, kit is the capital stock, nit is labor input and F
i is constant returns to
scale. The intermediate goods produced by each country are used to produce a country
specific final good that can be used for private consumption, cit, public consumption,
git, and investment, xit, according to
cit + git + xit ≤ Gi (y1it, y2it) , (3)
where Gi is constant returns to scale. Capital accumulates according to the law of
motion
xit = kit+1 − (1− δ) kit. (4)
If lump sum taxes and transfers across countries are available, the allocations on
the Pareto frontier satisfy the following efficiency: conditions,
− u
i
ct
uint
=
1
Gii,tF
i
nt
, i = 1, 2 (5)
uic,t
βuic,t+1
= 1− δ +Gii,t+1F ikt+1, i = 1, 2 (6)
G1j,t
G1j,t+1
[
G11,t+1F
1
k,t+1 + 1− δ
]
=
G2j,t
G2j,t+1
[
G22,t+1F
2
k,t+1 + 1− δ
]
, j = 1, 2 (7)
G11,t
G21,t
=
G12,t
G22,t
, (8)
which, together with the resource constraints, characterize the Pareto frontier.
The conditions above mean that there are no intratemporal wedges (conditions (5)),
no intertemporal wedges ((conditions (7)), and no production distortions (conditions
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(6) and (8)). Conditions (5) set the marginal rate of substitution between consumption
and labor equal to the marginal productivity in each country. Conditions (6) equate
the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution to the marginal productivity of capital.
Conditions (7) equate the marginal rates of transformation of the same intermediate
good in the two countries, and conditions (8) equate the marginal rates of technical
substitution for the two intermediate goods.
We can use the intratemporal and intertemporal conditions, (5) and (6), to write
the intertemporal condition for labor,
uint
βuin,t+1
=
Gii,tF
i
nt
Gii,t+1F
i
n,t+1
[
1− δ +Gii,t+1F ikt+1
]
, i = 1, 2. (9)
We explicitly characterize this intertemporal labor margin because are interested in
understanding when it is optimal not to distort this margin.
Next we consider an economy with distorting taxes. Throughout we allow for trans-
fers across governments.6 We begin by considering only country-specific consumption
and labor income taxes. We then include a richer tax system with alternative taxes
and discuss alternative implementations.
2.1 Competitive equilibria with consumption and labor in-
come taxes
We now describe a competitive equilibrium with taxes in which governments finance
public consumption and initial debt with proportional taxes on consumption and labor
income, τ cit and τ
n
it , as well as a tax on initial wealth, li0.
Each country has two types of firms. Given that the technologies are constant
returns to scale, we assume, without loss of generality, that there are two types of
representative firms. The intermediate good firm in each country uses the technology
in (2) to produce the intermediate good using capital and labor, purchases investment
goods, and accumulates capital according to (4). Let Vi0 be the value of the firm in
period zero after the dividend paid in that period, di0. The intermediate good firm
6We solve for the whole Pareto frontier. It can be shown that there are welfare weights such that
transfers are zero.
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maximizes the value of dividends
Vi0 + di0 =
∞∑
t=0
Qt [pit (yi1t + yi2t)− witnit − qitxit] (10)
subject to (2) and (4), where pit is the price of the intermediate good in units of a
numeraire (or common money across countries) at t, wit is the wage rate, and qit is
the price of investment, or equivalently of the final good, all in units of the same
numeraire. Qt is the intertemporal price of the common numeraire at time t in units
of the numeraire at zero (Q0 = 1). Because the intermediate goods are traded, and
there are no tariffs, the prices of each of the intermediate goods are the same in the
two countries.
If we define rft+1 to be the return on one period bonds in units of the numeraire
between period t and t+ 1, then it must be the case that
Qt
Qt+1
= 1 + rft+1, for t ≥ 0. (11a)
The final goods firm in each country uses the technology in (3) to produce the
final good using foreign and domestically produced intermediate goods to maximize
the value of dividends
∞∑
t=0
Qt
[
qitG
i (y1it, y2it)− p1ty1it − p2ty2it
]
. (12)
This problem reduces to a sequence of static problems.
Household The household budget constraint in each country is
∞∑
t=0
Qt [qit (1 + τ
c
it) cit − (1− τnit)witnit] ≤ (1− li0) ai0, (13)
with
ai0 = Vi0 + di0 +Q−1bi0 +
(
1 + rf0
)
fi0,
where ai0 denotes net holdings of assets by the household of country i, Q−1bi0 denotes
holdings of domestic public debt in units of the numeraire, inclusive of interest, and(
1 + rf0
)
fi0 denotes holdings of claims on households in the other country, in units of
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the numeraire, also inclusive of interest. Without loss of generality, households within
a country hold claims to the firms in that country as well as the public debt of the
government of that country. There is an internationally traded bond.
The household’s problem is to maximize utility (1) subject to (13).
Government The budget constraint of the government of each country is given
by
∞∑
t=0
Qt [τ
c
itqitcit + τ
n
itwitnit − qitgit] + li0ai0 = Q−1bi0 − Ti0, (14)
where Ti0 denotes transfers received by the government of country i from other gov-
ernments, so that
T10 + T20 = 0. (15)
The budget constraints of the government and the household (with equality) in
each country imply
∞∑
t=0
Qt [pityit − qit (cit + git + xit)] = −
(
1 + rf0
)
fi0 − Ti0, (16)
which can be written as the balance of payments condition
∞∑
t=0
Qt [pityijt − pjtyjit] = −
(
1 + rf0
)
fi,0 − Ti0 (17)
with
(
1 + rf0
)
f1,0 +
(
1 + rf0
)
f2,0 = 0.
A competitive equilibrium for this economy consists of a set of allocations {cit, nit, yijt, kit+1, xit}
and di0, prices {qit, pit, wit, Qt, Vi0}, and policies {τ cit, τnit , li0, Ti0}, given
{
ki0, Q−1bi0,
(
1 + rf0
)
fi0
}
such that households maximize utility subject to their constraints, firms maximize
value, the balance of payments conditions (17) hold, and markets clear in that (2), (3),
and (4) together with (15) are satisfied.
Note that we have not explicitly specified the governments’ budget constraints
because they are implied by the other constraints.
We say that an allocation {cit, nit, yijt, kit+1, xit} is implementable if it is part of a
competitive equilibrium.
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The first order conditions of the household’s problem include
− u
i
c,t
uin,t
=
(1 + τ cit) qit
(1− τnit)wit
, (18)
uic,t
(1 + τ cit)
=
Qtqit
Qt+1qit+1
βuic,t+1(
1 + τ cit+1
) , (19)
for all t ≥ 0, where uic,t and uin,t denote the marginal utilities of consumption and labor
in period t.
The first order conditions of the firms’ problems are, for all t ≥ 0,
pitF
i
n,t = wit (20)
Qtqit = Qt+1pit+1F
i
k,t+1 +Qt+1qit+1 (1− δ) , (21)
where F in,t and F
i
k,t denote the marginal products of capital and labor in period t,
together with
qitG
i
j,t = pjt. (22)
By combining the household’s and firm’s equilibrium conditions, it can be shown
that the value of the firm in (10) is
Vi0 + di0 = qi0
[
1− δ +Gii,0F ik,0
]
ki0. (23)
The first order conditions can be rearranged as
− u
i
c,t
uin,t
=
(1 + τ cit)
(1− τnit)Gii,tF in,t
(24)
uic,t
βuic,t+1
=
(1 + τ cit)(
1 + τ cit+1
) [Gii,t+1F ik,t+1 + 1− δ] , (25)
as well as (7) and (8), repeated here,
G1j,t
G1j,t+1
[
G11,t+1F
1
k,t+1 + 1− δ
]
=
G2j,t
G2j,t+1
[
G22,t+1F
2
k,t+1 + 1− δ
]
, j = 1, 2
G12,t
G11,t
=
G22,t
G21,t
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for all t ≥ 0.
Comparing these conditions with the ones for the Pareto frontier with lump sum
taxation, (5), (6), (7), and (8), we have that the consumption and labor taxes create
an intratemporal wedge in (24), and that time varying consumption taxes create in-
tertemporal wedges in (25). Taxes do not affect the production efficiency conditions
(7) and (8).
Using conditions (24) and (25), we can write
uin,t
βuin,t+1
=
(1− τnit)(
1− τnit+1
) Gii,tF in,t
Gii,t+1F
i
n,t+1
[
Gii,t+1F
i
k,t+1 + 1− δ)
]
, (26)
which makes it clear how the taxes affect the labor intertemporal margin.
A competitive equilibrium has no intertemporal distortions in consumption from
period s onward if the first order conditions (25) and (6) coincide for all t ≥ s. Simi-
larly, a competitive equilibrium has no intertemporal distortions in labor from period
s onward if the first order conditions (26) and (9) coincide for all t ≥ s. Finally, a
competitive equilibrium has no intertemporal distortions from period s onward if it
has no such distortions for both consumption and labor.
With the taxes that we consider here, it is not possible to create production dis-
tortions in the use of the traded goods, so that (7) and (8) always have to be satisfied.
These marginal conditions will have to be imposed as restrictions to the Ramsey prob-
lem, but as we show below, they will not be binding at the Ramsey optimum.
2.1.1 Implementability
In order to characterize the Ramsey equilibrium, we begin by characterizing the set of
implementable allocations. An allocation {cit, nit, yijt, kit+1, xit} and period zero poli-
cies and prices, {li0, τ ci0, Ti0, qi0}, given {ki0, bi0, fi0} is implementable as a competitive
equilibrium if and only if they satisfy the resource constraints (2), (3), (4), and the
implementability conditions
∞∑
t=0
[
βtuic,tcit + β
tuin,tnit
]
=Wi0, (27)
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where
Wi0 = (1− li0)
uic,0
(1 + τ ci0)
[(
1− δ +Gii,0F ik,0
)
ki0 +Q−1bi0 +
(
1 + rf0
) fi,0
qi,0
]
(28)
together with (7) and (8). The proposition follows.
Proposition 1 (Characterization of the implementable allocations): Any
implementable allocation and period zero policies and prices satisfy the implementabil-
ity constraints (27), together with (7) and (8), as well as the resource constraints (2),
(3), (4). Furthermore, if an allocation satisfies these conditions for some period zero
policies and prices, then it is implementable by a tax system with consumption and
labor income taxes.
2.2 Cooperative Ramsey equilibria
A (cooperative) Ramsey equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium that is not Pareto
dominated by any other competitive equilibrium. The Ramsey allocation is the asso-
ciated implementable allocation.
We say that the Ramsey planner is unrestricted if the planner can choose poli-
cies and allocations in all periods subject only to the constraint that the resulting
allocations, prices, and policies constitute a competitive equilibrium.
Consider the following programming problem, referred to as the unrestricted Ram-
sey problem, which is to choose allocations and period zero policies to maximize a
weighted sum of utilities of the households of the two countries,
θ1U1 + θ2U2 (29)
with weights θi ∈ [0, 1], subject to the conditions (27) and the resource constraints.
Assume policies are unrestricted in the sense that for any allocation, li0 (or any of
the other initial taxes) can be chosen to satisfy (27). Then the unrestricted Ramsey
problem reduces to maximizing welfare subject to the resource constraints, and there-
fore it immediately follows that it is possible to implement the lump-sum tax allocation
as the Ramsey equilibrium.
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2.2.1 Ramsey problem
Suppose now that policies and initial conditions are restricted in the sense that house-
holds in each country must be allowed to keep an exogenous value of initial wealth W¯i,
measured in units of utility. Specifically, we impose the following restriction on the
Ramsey problem:
Wi0 = W¯i, (30)
which we refer to as the wealth restriction in utility terms. With this restriction,
policies, including initial policies, can be chosen arbitrarily, but the household must
receive a value of initial wealth in utility terms of W¯i (see Armenter (2008) for an
analysis with such a restriction).7
The Ramsey problem is to maximize (29), subject to the resource constraints (2),
together with (3) and (4), that are combined as
cit + git + kit+1 − (1− δ) kit ≤ G1 (y1it, y2it) , (31)
together with the implementability conditions (27), the wealth restriction (30), (7) and
(8) . Condition (28) does not restrict the problem since it is satisfied by the choices of
the initial taxes. We are going to write the problem without imposing the conditions
for production efficiency, (7) and (8). We will show that they are satisfied at the
optimum.
Define
vi
(
cit, nit;ϕ
i
)
= θui (cit, nit) + ϕ
i
[
uic,tcit + u
i
n,tnit
]
,
where ϕi is the multiplier of the implementability condition (27). We can now use the
efficiency conditions for the case with lump-sum taxes, (5), (6), (7), and (8), replacing
the marginal utilities of ui by the derivatives of the function vi. The solution of the
Ramsey problem is given by
− v
i
c,t
vin,t
=
1
Gii,tF
i
n,t
, i = 1, 2 (32)
7Chari et al. (2016) study equilibria with partial commitment in which the assumption in Ar-
menter (2008) applies every period. The government in each period has partial commitment to one
period returns on assets in utility terms. The Markov equilibrium coincides with the full commit-
ment equilibrium with wealth restrictions in utility terms. Thus, partial commitment provides one
rationalization for studying Ramsey equilibria with wealth restrictions in utility terms.
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vic,t
βvic,t+1
= 1− δ +Gii,t+1F ikt+1, i = 1, 2 (33)
G1j,t
G1j,t+1
[
G11,t+1F
1
k,t+1 + 1− δ
]
=
G2j,t
G2j,t+1
[
G22,t+1F
2
k,t+1 + 1− δ
]
, j = 1, 2 (34)
G11,t
G21,t
=
G12,t
G22,t
. (35)
Every Ramsey solution must satisfy the production efficiency conditions, (7) and
(8), even if the conditions were not imposed as a restriction to the problem. This
means that if we had considered tariffs as possible instruments, they would not need
to be used. The proposition follows.
Proposition 2 (Optimality of free trade)˙: Unrestricted international trade is
optimal.
In order to further characterize the optimal wedges, it is useful to write
vic,t = u
i
c,t
[
θi + ϕi
[
1− σit − σcnit
]]
vin,t = u
i
n,t
[
θi + ϕi
[
1 + σnit − σncit
]]
,
where
σit = −
uicc,tcit
uic,t
, σnit =
uinn,tnit
uin,t
, σncit = −
uinc,tcit
uin,t
, σcnit = −
uicn,tnit
uic,t
are own and cross elasticities that are only functions of consumption and labor at time
t.
Note also that if consumption and labor are constant over time, then the relevant
elasticities are also constant, so vic,t and v
i
n,t are proportional to u
i
c,t and u
i
n,t, respec-
tively. It then follows that it is optimal to have no intertemporal distortions. This
observation leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 3 (No intertemporal distortions in the steady state): If the
Ramsey equilibrium converges to a steady state, it is optimal to have no intertemporal
distortions asymptotically.
For standard macro preferences,
U i =
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
c1−σ
i
t − 1
1− σi − ηi
n1+σ
ni
t
1 + σni
]
, (36)
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the marginal conditions are
− u
i
c,t
uin,t
=
θi + ϕi (1 + σni)
θi + ϕi (1− σi)
1
Gii,tF
i
n,t
, (37)
together with the intertemporal efficiency conditions, (6), and the production efficiency
conditions, (7) and (8). The proposition follows.
Proposition 4 (No intertemporal distortions ever): Suppose that preferences
are given by (36). Then, the Ramsey solution has no intertemporal distortions for all
t ≥ 0.
Corollary: The Ramsey allocations can be implemented with consumption or
labor taxes that are constant over time, but possibly different across countries.
The two-country model nests the closed economy neoclassical growth model for
Gi (y1it, y2it) = yiit.
It follows that the results on the optimal taxation of capital also hold in the neoclassical
growth model. This is in contrast with the influential results of Chamley (1986) and
Judd (1985), which argue that capital should not be taxed in the steady state but
should be heavily taxed along a transition. They are also in contrast with the results
in the more recent literature, in Bassetto and Benhabib (2006) and Straub and Werning
(2015), that it may be optimal to tax capital at the maximum rate forever.
To obtain our result that there is no presumption that capital ought to be taxed
also along the transition, it is important that the initial confiscation be restricted not
only directly, as is common to assume in the literature, but also indirectly through
valuation effects, as proposed by Armenter (2008). This assumption is related to
partial commitment to asset returns, as argued by Chari et al. (2016).
Another important assumption to shorten the transition of heavy capital taxation
is that the tax system may be rich enough, in the sense that no taxes that are available
in advanced economies may be left out if relevant for policy. We consider such a rich
tax system, but that is not the common assumption in the literature. The assumptions
that indirect confiscation is possible while direct confiscation is not, together with a
restricted tax system, explain the contrasting results in the literature.
Note that the preferences considered in Proposition 4 are separable and homothetic
in both consumption and labor. These properties are used in Chari et al. (2016) to
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provide intuition for the results on the optimal taxation of capital by relating them to
results on uniform commodity taxation and production efficiency, as in Atkinson and
Stiglitz (1972) and Diamond and Mirrlees (1971).
The Ramsey allocation characterized in Propositions 2 through 4 can be imple-
mented in a variety of ways. The following sections describe alternative implementa-
tions.
3 Alternative implementations
In this section, we discuss a variety of other tax systems, including taxes on the income
from different assets and alternative ways of taxing consumption. Our analysis is
motivated by the observation that these alternative tax systems are widely used in
practice. We show that no tax system can yield higher welfare than the tax system
with only consumption and labor income taxes. We show that a variety of tax systems
can implement the Ramsey allocation associated with those taxes. Furthermore, some
tax systems do yield lower welfare.
3.1 Taxes on capital income, equity returns, and foreign assets
In this section, in addition to capital income taxes, we consider a common tax on the
returns from foreign assets and on the equity returns including capital gains. This is
a residence-based system where capital from different sources is treated the same. We
assume that firms are residents of the country where they produce. For convenience,
we keep both consumption and labor income taxes, but we discuss whether any of these
will be made redundant.
We now describe the problems of the firms and the household in each country and
define a competitive equilibrium. We maintain the assumption that ownership of firms
is domestic, but we will see that this is without loss of generality.
Firm The representative intermediate good firm in each country produces and
invests in order to maximize the present value of dividends, Vi0 + di0 =
∑∞
t=0Qtdit.
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Dividends, in units of the numeraire, dit, are given by
dit = pitF (kit, nit)−witnit− τ kit [pitF (kit, nit)− witnit − qitδkit]− qit [kit+1 − (1− δ)kit] ,
(38)
where τ kit is the tax rate on capital income net of depreciation.
The first order conditions of the firm’s problem are now (20), together with
Qtqit
Qt+1qit+1
= 1 +
(
1− τ kit+1
)(pit+1
qit+1
F ik,t+1 − δ
)
. (39)
Substituting for dit from (38) and using (20) and (39), it is easy to show that the
present value of the dividends at time zero in units of the numeraire is given by
Vi0 + di0 =
∞∑
t=0
Qtdit =
[
1 +
(
1− τ ki0
)(pi0
qi0
Fik,0 − δ
)]
pi0ki0. (40)
The problem of the final good firm is as before. The first order conditions are given
by (22) .
Households The flow of funds constraint in period t for the household in country
i in units of the numeraire is given by
bit+1 + Vitsit+1 + fit+1 (41a)
=
Qit−1
Qit
bit + (Vit + dit) sit − τit
(
Vit − Vit−1 + dit − (qit − qit−1)Vit−1
qit−1
)
sit +(
1 + rft
)
fit − τit
(
rft −
qit − qit−1
qit−1
)
fit + (1− τnit)witnit − (1 + τ cit) qitcit.
In period 0, the constraint is
bi1 + Vi0si1 + fi1 (42)
= (1− li0)
[
Qi−1bi0 + (Vi0 + di0) si0 − τi0
(
Vi0 − Vi−1 + di0 − (qi0 − qi−1)Vi−1
qi−1
)
si0
]
+
(1− li0)
[
1 + rf0 − τi0
(
rf0 −
qi0 − qi−1
qi−1
)]
fi0 + (1− τni0)wi0ni0 − (1 + τ ci0) qi0ci0.
Dividends and capital gains are taxed at rate τit with an allowance for numeraire
inflation. Returns on foreign assets are also taxed at the same rate, τit, also with an
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allowance for numeraire inflation. The returns on public debt, bit, are country specific,
Qit−1
Qit
, because assets can be taxed at different rates in the different countries.
The household’s problem is to maximize utility (1) , subject to (41a), (42), and
no-Ponzi-scheme conditions, limT→∞QiT+1biT+1 ≥ 0, and limT→∞QiT+1fiT+1 ≥ 0.
The first order conditions of the household’s problem in each country are, for t ≥ 0,
(18), and
uic,t
(1 + τ cit)
=
Qitqit
Qit+1qit+1
βuic,t+1(
1 + τ cit+1
) , (43)
together with
Qit
Qit+1
= (1− τit+1)
(
1 + rft+1
)
+ τit+1
qit+1
qit
with Qi0 = 1 (44a)
and
Qit
Qit+1
=
(Vit+1 + dit+1)− τit+1
(
Vit+1 − Vit + dit+1 − qit+1−qitqit Vit
)
Vit
, (45a)
which implies that
1 + rft+1 =
Vit+1 + dit+1
Vit
. (46a)
This condition on the two returns can be written, using 1 + rft+1 =
Qt
Qt+1
, as
QtVit = Qt+1Vit+1 +Qt+1dit+1. (47a)
Imposing that limT→∞QT+1ViT+1 = 0, then
Vit =
∞∑
s=0
Qt+1+s
Qt
dit+1+s.
The present value of dividends for the households of country i is a different expres-
sion from the expression above because they pay taxes on the asset income. Using
(45a), we have that
Vi0 =
∞∑
t=0
(
1− τˆait+1
)
Qit+1dit+1,
where 1 − τˆait+1 = Πts=0 (1− τˆis+1), and 1 − τˆit+1 = (1−τit+1)(
1−τit+1 qit+1Qit+1qitQit
) . The values are
the same since
(
1− τˆait+1
)
Qit+1 = Qt+1. This condition is obtained from (44a).
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The value of the firm for the households in country i including the dividends in
period 0 is
Vi0 + di0 − τi0
(
Vi0 + di0 − qi0Vi−1
qi−1
)
(49)
= (1− τi0) (Vi0 + di0) + τi0 qi0Vi−1
qi−1
.
Notice that the market price of the firm before dividends, Vi0 + di0, is a linear function
of the value for the firm for the households of each country, so that the solution of
the maximization problem of the firm also maximizes shareholder value. That would
also be the case if the stocks were held by the households of the foreign country. This
means that the restriction that firms are owned by the domestic households is without
loss of generality.
Using the no-Ponzi scheme condition, the budget constraints of the household, (41a)
and (42), can be consolidated into the single budget constraint,
∞∑
t=0
Qit [qit (1 + τ
c
it) cit − (1− τnit)witnit] = (1− li0) ai0, (50)
where
ai0 = Qi−1bi0 + (1− τi0) (Vi0 + di0) + τi0 qi0Vi−1
qi−1
+
[
1 + rf0 − τi0
(
1 + rf0 −
qi0
qi−1
)]
fi0.
(51)
Using (40) as well as s0 = 1, the initial asset holdings in (51) can be written as
ai0 = Qi−1bi0 + (1− τi0) qi0
[
k0 +
(
1− τ ki0
) (
Gii,0Fik,0 − δ
)
ki0
]
+ τi0
qi0Vi−1
qi−1
+
[
1 + rf0 − τi0
(
1 + rf0 −
qi0
qi−1
)]
fi0
The interest rate parity condition is obtained from
Qt
Qt+1
=
qit+1
qit
[
1 +
(
1− τ kit+1
)(pit+1
qit+1
F ik,t+1 − δ
)]
(52)
for i = 1, 2, or
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q1t+1
q1t
[
1 +
(
1− τ k1t+1
)(p1t+1
q1t+1
F 1k,t+1 − δ
)]
=
q2t+1
q2t
[
1 +
(
1− τ k2t+1
)(p2t+1
q2t+1
F 2k,t+1 − δ
)]
.
(53)
Using (22) to replace the relative prices of the intermediate and final goods, it
follows that
G1j,t
G1j,t+1
[
1 +
(
1− τ k1t+1
) (
G11,t+1F
1
k,t+1 − δ
)]
(54)
=
G2j,t
G2j,t+1
[
1 +
(
1− τ k2t+1
) (
G22,t+1F
2
k,t+1 − δ
)]
, for j = 1, 2.
To get production efficiency, that is, to satisfy (8), we need either to set the two
tax rates to zero or to pick τ k1t+1 and τ
k
2t+1 according to
τ k1t+1
(
G11,t+1F
1
k,t+1 − δ
)
(55)
= τ k2t+1
(
G11,t+1F
1
k,t+1 − δ −
(
G1j,t+1/G
2
j,t+1
G1j,t/G
2
j,t
− 1
))
, for j = 1, 2.
In order to ensure production efficiency, there has to be an adjustment to the move-
ments in the real exchange rate. The tax revenue on the return on capital in the
consumption of one country must be equal to the tax revenue on the return on capital
in the consumption of the other country minus the proportionate change in the real
exchange rate.
Using the intertemporal condition of the household (43), and
Qit
Qit+1
= (1− τit+1) Qt
Qt+1
+ τit+1
qit+1
qit
(56a)
obtained from (44a), together with Qt
Qt+1
= 1 + rft+1, and combining it with the firm’s
condition (39), together with (22), we obtain
uic,t
(
1 + τ cit+1
)
βuic,t+1 (1 + τ
c
it)
= 1 + (1− τit+1)
(
1− τ kit+1
) (
Gii,t+1F
i
k,t+1 − δ
)
. (57)
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The marginal conditions in this economy can be summarized by
− u
i
c,t
uin,t
=
(1 + τ cit)
(1− τnit)Gii,tF in,t
, (58)
the intertemporal condition (57), the interest rate parity condition (54), and condition
(8), for all t ≥ 0.
In this economy with a common tax on equity and foreign returns, it is possible
to set to zero either the consumption tax or the labor income tax, but not both. The
Ramsey allocation can be implemented with a (possibly time-varying) common tax on
home and foreign assets. Capital income taxes in both countries either must be set
to zero or must be set according to the difference in real returns in the goods of the
two countries to ensure production efficiency. For standard macro preferences, all the
taxes on assets are set to zero and the labor income tax is constant over time. In
this economy with a common tax on domestic equity and foreign returns, firms use a
common price to value dividends. If relaxed, the restriction that firms are owned by
the domestic residents would not change the implementable allocations.
Consider the tax systems that do not tax either consumption or labor, but do have
the other taxes. We refer to a tax system in which consumption taxes are set to zero as
a no-consumption tax system, and similarly for the labor tax. The proposition follows.
The proof is straightforward.
Proposition 5 (Common tax on domestic equity and foreign returns) :
None of the tax systems considered here give higher welfare than the tax system with
only consumption and labor income taxes. The Ramsey equilibrium under the no-
consumption tax or the no-labor income tax system requires the taxation of domestic
and foreign assets at the same rate. Capital income taxes can be set to zero. For
standard macro preferences, only the consumption tax or the labor tax will be used,
and it will be constant over time.
3.2 Border-adjusted value-added taxes and labor income taxes
Consider next an economy in which consumption taxes are replaced by value-added
taxes levied on firms with border adjustment. Border adjustment means that firms in a
country do not pay VAT taxes on exports and cannot deduct imports. Taxes on assets
are set to zero, but labor income taxes are not. The value-added taxes are denoted by
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τ vit. The setup is the same as in the economy with only consumption and labor income
taxes, except that we distinguish prices in this economy with carets. Because taxes on
assets are zero, there is a single intertemporal price of the numeraire.
The intermediate good firm now maximizes
∞∑
t=0
Qˆt [(pˆi1tyi1t + pˆi2tyi2t)− wˆitnit − qˆitxit] (59)
−
∞∑
t=0
Qˆtτ
v
it [pˆiityiit − qˆitxit]
subject to (2) and (4), where pˆijt is the price of the intermediate good produced in
country i and sold in country j.
The final goods firm now maximizes
∞∑
t=0
Qˆt
[
qˆitG
i (y1it, y2it)− pˆ1ity1it − pˆ2ity2it
]− (60)
∞∑
t=0
Qˆtτ
v
it
[
qˆitG
i (y1it, y2it)− pˆiityiit
]
.
The household problem is the same as above, except that the consumption taxes
are set to zero.
The first order conditions of the household’s problem now include
− u
i
c,t
uin,t
=
qˆit
(1− τnit) wˆit
, t ≥ 0 (61)
uic,t =
Qˆtqˆit
Qˆt+1qˆit+1
βuic,t+1, t ≥ 0. (62)
The first order conditions of the firms’ problems for an interior solution are
pˆiit (1− τ vit)F in,t = wˆit (63)
Qˆtqˆit (1− τ vit) = Qˆt+1pˆiit+1
(
1− τ vit+1
)
F ik,t+1 + Qˆt+1qˆit+1
(
1− τ vit+1
)
(1− δ)) (64)
pˆiit (1− τ vit) = pˆijt (65)
qˆitG
i
i,t = pˆiit (66)
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qˆit (1− τ vit)Gij,t = pˆjit, for j 6= i. (67)
In order to show equivalence between these two tax systems, consider the following
prices with value-added taxes. Let
qˆit (1− τ vit) = qit (68)
pˆiit (1− τ vit) = pit (69)
pˆijt = pit, j 6= i, wˆit = wit, Qˆt = Qt. (70)
Replacing the prices with caret in the first order conditions in the economy with value-
added taxes, we get
− u
i
c,t
uin,t
=
qit
(1− τ vit) (1− τnit)wit
, t ≥ 0 (71)
uic,t =
Qtqit
Qt+1qit+1
(
1− τ vit+1
)
(1− τ vit)
βuic,t+1, t ≥ 0 (72)
pitF
i
n,t = wit (73)
pit = pit (74)
Qtqit = Qt+1pit+1F
i
k,t+1 +Qt+1qit+1 (1− δ)) (75)
qitG
i
j,t = pjt. (76)
These are the same conditions as in the economy with consumption taxes with
1− τ vit =
1
1 + τ cit
. (77)
The budget constraints of households in the two cases are (13) and
∞∑
t=0
Qˆt [qˆitcit − (1− τnit) wˆitnit] ≤ (1− li0) ai,0, (78)
where
ai,0 = qˆi0 (1− τ vi0)
[
1− δ +Gii,0F ik,0
]
ki0 +Qi,−1bi0 +
(
1 + rfi0
)
fi,0.
Using the condition establishing the equivalence between the prices in the two
economies, (68) and (70), it follows that the budget constraint in the value-added
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economy (78) becomes (13).
The budget constraints of the governments in the value-added economy are given
by
∞∑
t=0
Qˆt
[
τ vit [pˆiityiit − qˆitxit] + τ vit
[
qˆitG
i (y1it, y2it)− pˆiityiit
]
+ [τnitwˆitnit − qitgit]
]
= −li0ai0 +Qi,−1bi0 − Ti0. (79)
The balance of payments conditions are
∞∑
t=0
Qˆt [pˆijtyijt − pˆjityjit] = −
(
1 + rfi0
)
fi,0 − Ti0, (80)
where
(
1 + rf10
)
f1,0 +
(
1 + rf20
)
f2,0 = 0.
Since pˆijt = pit, for j 6= i, the balance of payments condition coincides with the one
with consumption and labor income taxes.
The two economies are equivalent. This is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 (Value-added taxes with border adjustment): Competitive
equilibrium allocations in the economies with consumption and value-added taxes co-
incide if the taxes in the two systems satisfy (77).
3.3 Value-added taxes without border adjustment: The role
of tariffs
Consider next an economy just like the one in the previous section, except that value-
added taxes are levied on firms without border adjustment. This means that the
taxation of intermediate goods will be source based. We will also consider tariffs.
The tariff levied by country j on the good imported from the other country i is de-
noted by τ yijt. The value-added taxes in country i are denoted by τ
v
it. The intermediate
goods firm now maximizes
∞∑
t=0
Qˆt [(1− τ vit) (pˆi1tyi1t + pˆi2tyi2t − qˆitxit)− wˆitnit] (81)
subject to (2) and (4), where pˆijt is the price of the intermediate good produced in
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country i and sold in country j.
The final goods firm in country 1 now maximizes
∞∑
t=0
Qˆt (1− τ v1t)
[
qˆ1tG
1 (y11t, y21t)− pˆ11ty11t − (1 + τ y21t) pˆ21ty21t
]
(82)
and similarly for country 2.
The household problem is the same as above, except that the consumption taxes
are set to zero.
The first order conditions of the household’s problem are
− u
i
c,t
uin,t
=
qˆit
(1− τnit) (1− τ vit) pˆiitF in,t
, t ≥ 0 (83)
uic,t =
Qˆtqˆit
Qˆt+1qˆit+1
βuic,t+1, t ≥ 0. (84)
The first order conditions of the firms’ problems for an interior solution are
pˆiit (1− τ vit)F in,t = wˆit (85)
Qˆtqˆit (1− τ vit) = Qˆt+1pˆiit+1
(
1− τ vit+1
)
F ik,t+1 + Qˆt+1qˆit+1
(
1− τ vit+1
)
(1− δ)) (86)
pˆiit = pˆijt ≡ pˆit (87)
qˆitG
i
i,t = pˆiit, i = 1, 2 (88)
qˆitG
i
j,t =
(
1 + τ yjit
)
pˆjit, for i 6= j. (89)
We can rearrange the first order conditions as
− u
i
c,t
uin,t
=
1
(1− τnit) (1− τ vit)Gii,tF in,t
, t ≥ 0 (90)
uic,t (1− τ vit) =
(
1− τ vit+1
)
βuic,t+1
[
Gii,t+1F
i
k,t+1 + 1− δ)
]
.
Using (88) and (89), it follows that
qˆ1t
qˆ2t
=
(1 + τ y21t)G
2
2,t
G12,t
=
G21,t
(1 + τ y12t)G
1
1,t
. (91)
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Using (86) and (88), we have that
1− τ v1t+1
1− τ v1t
qˆ1t+1
qˆ1t
[
G11,t+1F
1
k,t+1 + 1− δ
]
=
1− τ v2t+1
1− τ v2t
qˆ2t+1
qˆ2t
[
G22,t+1F
2
k,t+1 + 1− δ
]
. (92)
The marginal conditions are summarized by
− u
i
c,t
uin,t
=
1
(1− τnit) (1− τ vit)Gii,tF in,t
(93)
uic,t (1− τ vit) =
(
1− τ vit+1
)
βuic,t+1
[
Gii,t+1F
i
k,t+1 + 1− δ)
]
(94)(
1− τ v1t+1
)
(1− τ v2t)
(
1 + τ y21t+1
)(
1− τ v2t+1
)
(1− τ v1t) (1 + τ y21t)
G12,t
G12,t+1
[
G11,t+1F
1
k,t+1 + 1− δ
]
=
G22,t
G22,t+1
[
G22,t+1F
2
k,t+1 + 1− δ
]
(95)(
1− τ v1t+1
)
(1− τ v2t) (1 + τ y12t)(
1− τ v2t+1
)
(1− τ v1t)
(
1 + τ y12t+1
) G11,t
G11,t+1
[
G11,t+1F
1
k,t+1 + 1− δ
]
=
G21,t
G21,t+1
[
G22,t+1F
2
k,t+1 + 1− δ
]
(96)
G12,t
G11,t
=
(1 + τ y21t) (1 + τ
y
12t)G
2
2,t
G21,t
. (97)
In order to have production efficiency, verifying (7) and (8), it must be that(
1− τ v1t+1
)
(1− τ v2t)
(1− τ v1t)
(
1− τ v2t+1
) = 1 + τ y12t+1
1 + τ y12t
and (
1 + τ y12t+1
) (
1 + τ y21t+1
)
= (1 + τ y12t) (1 + τ
y
21t) = 1.
The Ramsey allocation in the economy with consumption taxes can be implemented
in this economy with a VAT without border adjustment and tariffs. The tariffs have
to compensate each other 1 + τ y12t = 1/ (1 + τ
y
21t), so that if the tariff is positive in
one country, it must be negative in the other. The compensating tariffs must be time
varying to undo the distortions imposed by the VAT taxes on the (dynamic) production
efficiency condition, (7). The value-added taxes will have to move over time, differently
in the two countries to implement the optimal intertemporal distortions, and the labor
income tax will implement the optimal intratemporal distortion. Without tariffs, the
Ramsey allocation in the economy with both consumption and labor income taxes
cannot in general be achieved.
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For standard macro preferences, there is no need for tariffs, and the Ramsey allo-
cation can be achieved with VAT taxes that, in general, are different across countries
but constant over time. Border tax adjustments in this case are irrelevant.
We state these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 7 (Value-added taxes without border adjustment): The Ram-
sey allocation can be implemented with consumption taxes replaced by value-added
taxes without border adjustment and tariffs. The tariffs must compensate each other
and have to be time varying to compensate value-added taxes that may move differ-
ently across time in the two countries. For standard macro preferences, the value-added
tax rates are constant over time, and therefore there is no need for tariffs.
Corollary: In general, the Ramsey allocation cannot be implemented with a tax
system with labor income taxes and value-added taxes without border adjustment.
Origin- versus destination-based taxation In order to discuss restrictions
on tax systems based on origin and destination, we need to be clear about what we
mean by a destination-based system and an origin-based system mean. One possible
meaning is the following. A destination-based system is one in which taxes are set
by the destination country; similarly, an origin-based system is one in which taxes
are set by the country from where the goods originate. In such a destination-based
system there is no reason to tax imports at the same rate as domestically produced
goods. Similarly, in an origin-based system, there is no reason to tax exports at the
same rate as domestically used goods. In such a system, whether destination-based or
origin-based, there would be four tax rates that would allow to implement the Ramsey
allocation. Under the destination based system, the Ramsey policy would set the rate
on imports equal to the rate on domestically produced goods, and under the origin-
based system, the rate on exports would be equal to the rate on the goods produced
in the destination country.
Another interpretation of destination- versus source-based systems is more restric-
tive but is also closer to what most people have in mind. That is, a destination-based
system is one where tax rates do not depend on origin, and an origin-based system is
one where tax rates do not depend on destination. In this case, the VAT system with
border adjustment would be a destination-based system, and the VAT system with-
out border adjustment would be an origin based system. In the case of value-added
taxes with border adjustment, the goods leave the country untaxed and are taxed in
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the destination country at the single value-added tax rate in the destination country.
In the case with value-added taxes without border adjustments, however, goods are
taxed at the single rate of the origin country. For this interpretation of destination-
and origin-based systems, the destination-based system does not impose relevant re-
strictions on the set of implementable allocations, but the origin-based system, would
in general impose such restrictions. Without tariffs, the destination-based system is
superior, since in general it is not possible to implement the Ramsey allocation without
tariffs when no border adjustments are made. Those restrictions would be undone by
tariffs, but tariffs would convert an origin-based system into a destination-based one.
4 Concluding remarks
We characterize cooperative Ramsey allocations in the open economy. We show that
free trade is also optimal in the second best Ramsey allocation and that for standard
macro preferences, capital should never be taxed. For general preferences there is no
presumption that capital should also be taxed along the transition. We study alterna-
tive implementations of the Ramsey allocation including residence-based taxation of
equity returns, foreign asset returns and firms profits. We also consider value-added
taxes with and without border adjustments. In these environments with capital ac-
cumulation, border adjustments matter for the optimal allocations. We discuss the
desirability of destination- versus origin-based taxation of goods.
The results on the taxation of capital are related to the influential results of Chamley
(1986) and Judd (1985) which argue that capital should not be taxed in the steady
state but should be heavily taxed along a transition. They are also related to the more
recent literature, in Bassetto and Benhabib (2006) and Straub and Werning (2015),
that challenge the optimality of zero taxation of capital in the steady state. The
contrasting results are explained in Chari et al. (2016).
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